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
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The Transition of Party System in Taiwan: Divergence or Convergence?

Gang Lin and Weixu Wu

Abstract

This article attempts to explore the evolution of power structure of the two main parties in Taiwan and the possibility of transformation of party politics from divergence to convergence. Institutionally, the game of plurality voting system tends to marginalize the third party and encourage a balanced two-party system. It may also pull the two parties toward the central line amid increasing interparty competition. From the social perspective, however, the inherently different supporters of the two parties tend to pull the parties away from the direction of convergence. While KMT supporters are more caring about economic growth and a good relationship with the mainland, DPP supporters are more concerned about distributional justice and worried that close cross-strait relations may present a greater threat to the island, either politically or economically. These social cleavages have underscored different policy positions of the two parties. This article concludes that while the KMT and the DPP have reduced their difference in social and economic policies, they are still divided on the issue of how to deal with the Chinese mainland, namely, whether Taiwan should be attached to or detached from the mainland in the future.

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Taiwan's elections of chief executive and legislature on 16 January 2016 have significantly changed the power relationship between the two main parties, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP not only gained control of the executive power but also obtained more than 60 percent of seats in the legislature. Meanwhile, the KMT was degraded into a medium-sized party, with 31 percent of seats in the legislature and the same percentage of votes for its candidate for the chief executive election. Will the KMT be further marginalized in Taiwanese party politics after this fiasco? Is the two-party system in Taiwan unsustainable, as some people speculated after the same fiasco of the DPP in 2008?

This article assumes that Taiwan's two-party system is determined by both the electoral system and social structure. The electoral system, featuring mainly a single-member-district plurality formula for the legislative election, is theoretically favorable to a two-party system and convergent party politics. Taiwanese society, with a clear cleavage on the issue of national identity, however, is conducive to divergent party politics. While in the United States and many other democratic societies, the ideologically left-right issue is often the main watershed distinguishing different parties, one unresolved social dispute in Taiwan is over how to handle its relations with the mainland: in the future, should Taiwan be more attached to the Chinese mainland or detached from it? The KMT, also called the Blue party because of the background color of its flag, does not totally exclude the option of national reunification while maintaining its current policy of "no unification, no independence, and no war." The DPP, called the Green party because of the background color of its flag as well, however, still retains the "Taiwan independence clause" in its party platform and refuses to accept the *de jure* one China framework or the "1992 consensus" in defining the status quo of cross-strait relations.¹ The KMT has had more connections with big business-people while neglecting, more or less, a balanced regional development and social distribution. The DPP has had more links with midsize and small entrepreneurs, the middle and working classes, environmentalists, as well as the southern part of Taiwan.

This article explores the evolution of the power structure of the two main parties in Taiwan and the possibility of transformation of party politics from divergence to convergence. It first examines the changing power structure of the two parties at the local and top levels in recent years and then observes the nature of party politics from the perspectives

of institutional design, social cleavages and buffers, and ideological orientations of different parties. This essay concludes that while the KMT and the DPP have reduced their difference in social and economic policies, they are still divided on the issue of how to deal with the Chinese mainland.

The terms “convergence” and “divergence” used in this article are related to the concepts of consensual and conflictual party systems defined by political scientists such as Arend Lijphart and Gabriel Almond. That is, in a consensual party system, the parties “commanding most of the legislative seats are not too far apart on policies and have a reasonable amount of trust in each other and in the political system,” while in a conflictual party system, “the legislature is dominated by parties that are far apart on issues or are highly antagonistic toward each other and the political system.”² These conceptual ideal types are employed to observe the continual variation in the nature of real party politics in Taiwan. This essay assumes that one important precondition for a convergent two-party system is a power balance between the ruling and opposition parties through periodic power turnovers between them. Otherwise, the opposition party will be marginalized and may therefore resort to extra-systematic confrontation with the ruling party, thus making political compromise and consensual party politics impossible. A balanced power relationship, however, *cannot* guarantee convergent party politics, as a divergent party system may result from other factors, such as social structure, institutional design, and traditional ideologies and policy platforms of different parties.

1. Two-Party System in Evolution

Party politics in Taiwan is associated with the birth of the DPP in 1986, with the KMT as the dominant ruling party until 2000. The splits of the KMT in 1993 and 2000 not only have produced three additional parties, the Chinese New Party (CNP), the People First Party (PFP), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), but also contributed to the DPP’s dominance of executive power between 2000 and 2008. Still, the DPP administration was then constrained by the majority of the Pan Blue camp (the KMT, CNP, and PFP) in the legislature. The KMT’s dominance of both executive and legislative branches from 2008 to 2016 was replaced by the supremacy of the DPP in these two branches in the wake of the 2016 elections. In other words, a two-party system in Taiwan has been

maintained through periodic power turnovers between the KMT and the DPP since 2008.

a. Party System at the Local Level

At the local level, power relations between the KMT and the DPP favored the KMT before 1997 but experienced periodic changes thereafter. From 1989 to 2014, Taiwan had conducted elections for city mayors and county magistrates seven times and elections for Taipei and Kaohsiung metropolitan mayors six times. These elections are conducted according to the plurality formula, without a second runoff when no candidate gains more than 50 percent of votes. This formula encourages two-party competition because the smaller third party has no chance to make a deal with either of the bigger parties during the otherwise second round of elections. The KMT and the DPP usually obtained more than 85 percent of votes and received a cumulative 149 positions out of 167 mayoralties and magistracies (89.2 percent) over the years. The KMT enjoyed a clear majority over the DPP in local executives in the 1989 and 1993 elections but began to lose its supremacy in 1997 when the DPP received a little more votes but much more executive positions than the KMT.³ The KMT again enjoyed supremacy in the 2005 and 2009 local executive elections, squeezing the DPP toward the southern part of Taiwan. As for the Taipei and Kaohsiung metropolitan mayoral elections between 1994 and 2006, the two parties divided the mayoralties evenly. During the 2010 metropolitan mayoral elections for New Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan, in addition to Taipei and Kaohsiung, the KMT managed to maintain three mayoralties in central and northern parts of Taiwan while the DPP maintained Tainan and Kaohsiung mayoralties in the south. The old political map showing a Blue north and a Green south, however, turned into what Shelley Rigger described as “a fat green doughnut encircling a much reduced blue center” after the “nine-in-one” elections in 2014 when the Green map expanded from the south to the north, crossing not only the Choshui River but also the Tamsui and Keelung rivers in the northern part of Taiwan.⁴ The KMT obtained only one metropolitan mayoralty (New Taipei City) and five county magistracies. Even if we consider Hualien County Magistrate Fu Kun-chi and Kinmen County Magistrate Chen Fu-hai as Blue figures, people living in the Pan Blue area account for only 26.78 percent of the total population. According to the statistics of the Central Election Commission, the KMT gained 7 percent less of the votes

than DPP. This unprecedented gap is actually even wider as the DPP-supported independent candidate for Taipei mayoralty Ko Wen-je received significant votes from the Green camp. In balance, the DPP's vote shares could be more than 10 percent higher than that of the KMT in the local executive elections, presaging its coming back to power in 2016.

The KMT usually enjoyed a majority of seats in metropolitan, city, and county councils. The first change occurred in 2002, when the DPP won 14 seats on the Kaohsiung council while the KMT and the PFP had 12 and 7 seats, respectively. More meaningful change happened in the elections for five metropolitan councils in 2010 when the KMT and the DPP each obtained 130 seats. During the 2014 elections, among 907 seats of 22 local councils, the KMT won 386 while the DPP received 291 even though the KMT's vote shares (36.86 percent) were slightly lower than the DPP (37.08 percent). Among 547 seats of 16 city and county councils, the KMT won 235, and the DPP obtained 124. By contrast, among 360 seats of the six metropolitan councils, the DPP won 167 while the KMT maintained 151, suggesting increasing influence of the DPP in the urban areas. At the levels of township chiefs and representatives, the KMT still enjoys clear advantages over the DPP with a ratio of 39.2 percent versus 26.5 percent and a ratio 25.2 percent versus 9 percent, respectively. Most of township representatives (65.6 percent), however, are obtained by nonpartisan figures.⁵ At the grassroots level (village and neighborhood heads) the KMT still gains more seats than the DPP (22.88 percent vs. 4.97 percent), while a majority of seats (over 72 percent) are held by nonpartisan figures.

In a nutshell, the evaporation of the KMT's supremacy over the DPP started at the metropolitan mayoral elections, continued with elections for city mayoralties and county magistracies, and ended with metropolitan council elections. The periodic changes of electoral outcomes at the local executive level have portended the change of power structure at the higher levels.

b. Party System at the Top Level

Power relations between the KMT and DPP have changed at the top as well. From 1993 to 2000, Taiwan had three relevant parties in its legislature: the KMT as the dominant party, the DPP as the medium-sized one, and the CNP as the smallest player. During the 2001 and 2004

legislative elections, the DPP became the biggest party, with more than 33 percent of votes and about 40 percent of seats, while the KMT dropped to the status of the second largest party, followed by the PFP, the TSU, and the CNP. However, the Pan Blue camp was still bigger than the Pan Green camp combining the DPP and the TSU.

A reform on the electoral formula for Taiwan's legislature was implemented in 2008. In addition to cutting in half the number of legislators and changing the term of legislators from three to four years to match the election date of chief executive, the new system gerrymandered 73 single-member districts, with a much smaller portion of seats (34) being produced by proportional representation party votes and the other 6 seats being reserved for aborigines. Such a basically winner-take-all game not only marginalized smaller parties psychologically but also produced mechanically a big gap between vote (38.2 percent) and seat (23.9 percent) shares of the DPP in the 2008 legislative election, "creating a sense of disenfranchisement among the losers."⁶ The same game continued in 2012 when the KMT obtained 56.5 percent of seats with 48.2 percent of district votes, and the DPP gained only 35.4 percent of seats despite 43.8 percent of district votes. During the 2016 legislative elections, however, the DPP gained 60.18 percent of seats with 44.6 percent of district votes and 44.1 percent of party votes while the KMT obtained only 30.97 percent of seats with a higher percentage of district votes but lower rate of party votes. Meanwhile, two other smaller parties, the PFP and the New Power Party (NPP), have gained fewer than 10 percent of seats despite their higher expectations before the elections. The KMT's defeat in the legislative elections was similar to its poor performance in the 2001 and 2004 elections. But the DPP, for the first time, obtained a clear majority of seats in the legislature, similar to the supremacy that the KMT enjoyed in the 2008 and 2012 elections. Electoral outcomes before and since 2008 have demonstrated the effectiveness of institutional variables in shaping Taiwan's two-party system in the legislature, as can be seen in Table 1.

Taiwan started direct elections for its chief executive in 1996. For the first two elections, more than two candidates ran for the position, and candidates of the two main parties received 75.1 percent of votes in 1996 and 62.4 percent of votes in 2000. Since 2004, the elections have mainly become a game for the KMT and the DPP only; the PFP ran for the 2012 and 2016 elections but obtained only insignificant

votes, suggesting again that the plurality system is in favor of a two-party system. During the 2016 elections, the DPP's candidate Tsai Ing-wen obtained 6.89 million votes and 56.12 percent of vote shares. By contrast, the KMT's candidate Chu Li-luan (Eric Chu) obtained only 3.81 million votes and 31.04 percent of vote shares. While Tsai gained about the same votes that Ma Ying-jeou obtained in the 2012 elections, the vote shares she gained were higher because of the unprecedentedly low voter turnout in the 2016 elections. In both votes and vote shares, Tsai has done better than DPP's Chen Shui-bian in 2004 but failed to break the historical record created by Ma in 2008, as can be seen from Table 2 and Figure 1.

Table 1: Vote and Seat Shares in Legislative Elections: 1992–2016 (Percentages)

Party		1992	1995	1998	2001	2004	2008	2012	2016
KMT	Vote shares	52.7	46.1	46.4	28.6	32.8	53.5 (51.2)	48.2 (44.6)	38.9 (26.9)
	Seat shares	58.4	51.8	55.1	30.2	35.1	71.9	56.6	31.0
DPP	Vote shares	31.4	33.2	29.6	33.4	35.7	38.2 (36.9)	43.8 (34.6)	44.6 (44.1)
	Seat shares	31.7	32.9	31.1	38.7	39.6	23.9	35.4	60.2
CNP	Vote shares	—	13.0	7.1	2.6	0.1	0 (3.95)	0.08 (1.49)	0.5 (4.2)
	Seat shares	—	12.8	4.89	0.4	0.4	0	0	0
PFP	Vote shares	—	—	—	18.6	13.9	0.3 (0)	1.3 (5.5)	1.3 (6.5)
	Seat shares	—	—	—	20.4	15.1	0.9	2.7	2.7
TSU/ NPP	Vote shares	—	—	—	7.8	7.8	0.96 (3.5)	0 (9.0)	3.8* (8.6)*
	Seat shares	—	—	—	5.8	5.3	0	2.7	4.4*
Total seats		161	164	225	225	225	113	113	113

* Including district and party votes gained by both the TSU and the NPP, as well as seat shares of the NPP.


Source: Central Election Commission in Taiwan (<http://www.cec.gov.tw>). Figures in parentheses refer to party votes.

Table 2: Vote Shares of Different Parties in Chief Executive Elections (Percentages)

	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
KMT	54.00	23.10	49.89	58.45	51.60	31.04
DPP	21.13	39.30	50.11	41.45	45.63	56.12
Others	14.90a*	36.84c*	—	—	2.77c*	12.84c*
	9.98b*	0.76d*	—	—	—	—
Voters Turnout	76.04	82.69	80.28	76.33	74.38	66.27

* a refers to vote shares of Lin Yang-kang, b refers to vote shares of Chen Li-an, c refers to vote shares of Soong Chu-yu (James Soong), and d refers to the combined vote shares of Hsu Hsin-liang and Lee Ao.

Source: Central Election Commission in Taiwan (<http://www.cec.gov.tw>).

Figure 1: Votes of Different Parties in Chief Executive Election (10,000)

Source: Central Electoral Commission in Taiwan (<http://www.cec.gov.tw>).

c. Party Identification in Evolution

The shift of votes in recent years from the KMT to the DPP reflects the changing party identification in Taiwan, which is visibly attributable to the outbreak of the March 18th Sunflower Movement related to economic recession on the island, suspicions of Ma's mainland policy in maintaining Taiwan's political autonomy and improving the livelihood of ordinary people in general and young people in particular, and the consequent "anti-China" sentiment among some people. The KMT's hurried push for the legislation of the Service Trade Agreement was perceived as a lack of due process and transparency in policymaking, therefore serving as a trigger of social protest. In addition to the visible impact of the Sunflower Movement, an intraparty power struggle within the KMT between chair Ma Ying-jeou and legislature speaker Wang Jin-pyng has also damaged the party's image among the public. Wang Jin-pyng's noncooperation with the Ma administration's policies and his intimate relations with the DPP's caucus convener Ker Chien-ming involving under-the-table deals resulted in Ma's invalid attempt to abolish Wang's party membership and official position. The eruption of power struggle in September 2013 has further highlighted the long structural problem of the KMT with the "deep Blue" (深

藍 *shenlan*) on the one side and the “native Blue” (本土藍 *bentulan*) on the other side — the “deep Blue” sticks to the KMT’s traditional ideology while the “native Blue” has more connections with local politics.

Both the Sunflower Movement and the Ma-Wang struggle have contributed to the evolution of party identification in Taiwan. In the past, many more people identified themselves with Pan Blue parties than with Pan Green parties. In a longitudinal survey conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in June 2014, however, more interviewees identified themselves with the DPP than with the KMT (more than 2 percent) for the first time.⁷ Similar surveys conducted by Taiwan Indicators Survey Research suggest that more interviewees identified themselves with the DPP than with the KMT as early as October 2013, right after the Ma-Wang struggle one month earlier. According to this series of surveys, the Sunflower Movement has increased DPP identifiers, but people’s identifications with the two parties since then have remained about the same, and few people identify with the NPP. Meanwhile, about 40 percent of interviewees have no party or color preferences over years, as can be seen from Table 3. This is the source of swing voters in Taiwan’s two-party politics, contributing significantly to periodic power turnovers on the island.

Table 3: Party Identifications (PI) Flux (Percentages)

KMT	PPF	Blue*	DPP	TSU	Green*	Neutral	Reject*	Survey Date
22.3	1.1	5.0	24.4	0.9	4.1	38.4	4.1	October 2013
21.8	0.9	5.1	23.7	0.9	4.9	40.0	2.9	December 2013
22.0	0.7	4.6	27.4	0.7	5.1	37.9	1.7	March 2014
25.0	1.1	5.5	23.5	0.5	4.7	37.6	2.3	June 2014
22.2	0.8	4.8	19.6	0.5	5.3	44.7	2.2	September 2014
21.8	0.9	5.1	23.7	0.9	4.9	40.0	2.9	December 2014
18.9	1.5	5.0	27.6	0.4	7.0	37.5	2.2	March 2015
20.3	1.6	5.7	25.6	0.6	5.2	39.1	2.2	June 2015
19.5	2.6	5.6	26.7	0.5	6.0	36.8	2.5	September 2015
21.9	2.6	4.9	28.7	0.8	5.2	34.1	2.0	December 2015
18.9	2.8	5.0	31.4	5.1	4.0	30.5	2.4	March 2016
17.4	1.7	5.1	31.9	4.2	5.1	33.1	1.8	June 2016
18.2	1.6	5.5	28.7	4.4	4.5	35.2	1.9	September 2016
20.8	1.5	5.1	26.4	1.6	5.1	37.3	2.4	Means
27.4 (Pan Blue)			33.1 (Pan Green)			37.3	2.4	Means

* “Blue” and “Green” are used in this survey to identify people who do not prefer specific parties but take sides with different political colors. From March 2016 on, the NPP has been added into the party list for the survey. For the sake of limited space, the preference rate to the NPP is combined with that to the TSU.

Source: Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (<http://www.tisr.com.tw>). This survey stopped in October 2016 because of limited resources.

The two main parties project different images to the Taiwanese people. According to a CATI (computer-assisted telephone interview) survey with 1,072 samples conducted by the Center for Taiwan Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University in October 2014 (hereafter the SJTU survey), more interviewees believed that the KMT was more capable than the DPP in promoting economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait (51.3 percent versus 14.2 percent), while slightly more people trusted that the DPP was more capable than the KMT in protecting Taiwanese interests (28.9 percent versus 26.2 percent). Although the Ma administration had achieved great progress in advancing both cross-strait relations and Taiwanese economic growth, people were not satisfied with his performance. While 14 percent of interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the Ma administration, 72.9 percent felt unsatisfied. Only 2 percent said they were very satisfied, but 44.6 percent felt very unsatisfied. Even among supporters of the KMT, 43.9 percent (as opposed to 45.5 percent) expressed their unhappiness with Ma's performance.⁸ The Ma administration's poor performance and the KMT's fiasco in the 2014 and 2016 elections have contributed to the shift of some people's preference for the ruling KMT.

d. Is the Two-Party System Sustainable?

Has the 2016 election fundamentally changed the two-party system in Taiwan? Some scholars consider the former as a "critical realignment election" that has a long influence on people's party affiliation and voting patterns. For them, the outcome of the 2016 election is not simply a power turnover from one party to another but a generational change as young voters overwhelmingly supported the DPP. The nativization of Taiwanese society has a negative impact on the KMT's political discourse, eventually leading to the end of the Blue-Green confrontation and divide in the society.⁹ According to Ogasawara Yoshiyuki, the declining KMT is likely to lose the only big metropolitan city (New Taipei City) under its control in the upcoming 2018 elections. The main political divide in Taiwan in the future would be that between the DPP and the rising NPP.¹⁰ Other scholars are more cautious about this prediction. According to Richard Bush, while shifting patterns of identity toward "Taiwanese" and party preferences may have foreshadowed a critical election, more than one election is needed to "establish a critical shift in social forces and political loyalties." The sustainability of the DPP's dominance

depends on Tsai's ability to accomplish her daunting policy agenda while facing an uncooperative Chinese mainland.¹¹ Shelley Rigger points out that the KMT's deep distress may or may not prove fatal, but the party seems to be "doubling down on its self-marginalizing approach." However, she also argues that political parties in the established two-party system are capable of "great resilience," and "for politicians in a hurry, the broken shell of the KMT may look like a better bet for a speedy rise than waiting for a spot to open in the DPP."¹² Still others believe that the 2016 election signals not "a lasting change in Taiwan's political landscape" but "a more ordinary alternation in power between the two principal parties in a democratic system."¹³ Since the KMT remains the largest opposition party on the island and no sign has suggested the disappearance of the Blue-Green divide on public policies, it is reasonable to predict the continuity of the existing two-party system in Taiwan. While young voters with stronger Taiwanese identities who are more concerned about the issues of distributive justice and environment protection enthusiastically supported the DPP in recent years, they also shifted their support from Chen Shui-bian to Ma Ying-jeou in the previous elections. The fact that the newborn NPP received only limited votes further suggests that generational factors are embedded in the existing two-party system.


It is clear that Tsai has brought the DPP to an unprecedented height after the elections, well overtaking the KMT. In the legislature, the DPP increased the number of its seats from 40 in 2012 to 68 in 2016, and the KMT decreased from 64 to 35. While it is not too bad for the KMT compared with the DPP's poor record in the 2008 legislative election, the shares of party votes of the KMT (26.9 percent) in 2016 were 10 percent lower than that of the DPP in the 2008 (36.9 percent), attributable to the loss of the Blue vote shares taken over by the PFP (6.5 percent) and the CNP (4.2 percent). As for the chief executive election, the gap between Eric Chu and Tsai Ing-wen in votes (3 million) and vote shares (25.08 percent) was even larger than that between Lien Chan and Chen Shui-bian in 2000 (with 2.05 million votes and 16.2 percent vote shares in difference). The worst case of scenarios did not occur, for unlike Lien who fell far behind James Soong in votes (1.73 million) and vote shares (13.74 percent) in 2000, Eric Chu managed to gain many more votes than James Soong in 2016. Chu's poor performance was obviously due to James Soong's taking over some portion of Blue votes and the low voter

turnout. It is estimated that among the three millions or so voters who voted for Ma Ying-jeou in 2012 but failed to vote for Eric Chu in 2016, about half of them switched votes to either James Soong (about 1.2 million votes) or Tsai Ing-wen (about 300,000 votes), and another half of them simply stayed home.¹⁴ This suggests that the social foundation for the Blue and the Green remains stable despite the huge gap between Tsai and Chu in votes and vote shares. Since the KMT could survive the 2000 fiasco, eventually marginalizing the PFP through leadership transition from chair Lee Teng-hui through Lien Chan to Ma Ying-jeou, there is no reason to assert that the KMT cannot maintain the status of the second largest opposition party and even move again to the power center in the future under favorable conditions, if history can provide any guidance. The key issue is whether the KMT can really take the lesson of failure and remain united despite acute intraparty competitions and struggles in the years to come. No sign suggests that the KMT will split into two camps. The KMT, despite its problems in the party assets issue, still has about 500,000 party members (more than the DPP) and other social resources. Whatever groups leave the party would have no bright futures, as the cases of the CNP, PFP, and TSU have suggested.

By employing Pan Blue versus Pan Green classification to recalculate their respective votes divided by qualified voters in elections for chief and local executives over the past two decades, several observations can be made (Figure 2).¹⁵ First, the effective participating rates (valid votes divided by qualified voters) vary between different types of elections, usually higher in chief executive elections than local executive elections except for the case in 2016.¹⁶ Second, the lowest point of Pan Green's supporting rates was 28.99 percent during the 2005 local executive elections and the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections, right after its highest point in the 2004 elections when Chen Shui-bian overtook Lien Chan with very small margin. While Pan Green's supporting rates have increased after the 2005–2006 elections, Tsai's supporting rate of 36.71 percent in the 2016 elections is not only lower than Ma Ying-jeou in 2012 (40.14 percent) and 2008 (44.2 percent), but also lower than Chen Shui-bian in 2004. Third, the Pan Blue's supporting rates are usually higher than the Pan Greens, excepting for the 2004 elections and the 2014 and 2016 fiascos in particular.¹⁷ The supporting rates of Eric Chu and James Soong combined together in

2016 were unprecedentedly lower than their DPP counterparts had ever obtained.

Figure 2: Pan Blue and Pan Green Supporting Rates in Chief and Local Executives Elections (Percentages)



Indeed, the 2014 and 2016 elections have significantly tipped the balance of power in Taiwan from one in favor of the Pan Blue camp to another in favor of the Pan Green camp. As the DPP has now achieved a clear majority in the legislature in addition to the overwhelming victory of Tsai Ing-wen over Eric Chu, it is natural for some people to speculate that the KMT has no capacity to counterbalance against the DPP, similar to the speculation in 2008 when the DPP was greatly defeated in both elections. The deep roots of party identity and support shift in Taiwan, however, are the difficulty in maintaining economic growth and equal social distribution against the backdrop of high social demand. Because of the poor performance of the Ma administration, many KMT supporters have either shifted their votes to other candidates or failed to vote. The new DPP administration could also face such a liability in governance, should it fail to resolve the dilemma in the years to come. In fact, since Tsai came to power, her popularity has declined rapidly. According to a survey conducted by Taiwan Thinktank — a Green think tank — in early November 2016, 40.6 percent of respondents are satisfied with Tsai's performance but 42.8 percent of them are unsatisfied.¹⁸

2. From a Divergent toward a Convergent Party System?

Several factors have contributed to the divergent features of the Taiwanese party system, while other factors suggest it may change from divergence to convergence. This section starts with a discussion on social cleavages and buffers, followed by an analysis of institutional factors. Finally, ideologies and policy platforms of the two main parties will be explored to

demonstrate a possible change from a divergent toward a convergent party system in the future Taiwan.

a. Social Cleavages and Buffers

The social roots of the divergent party system in Taiwan are the longtime disputes — explicitly or tacitly — on whether the island should be attached to or detached from the mainland in the future. In other words, party identification in Taiwan is shaped greatly by people's self-identification and their positions on the issues of unification and independence. Much literature has shown that more people nowadays identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese or both, and more people support independence rather than unification. According to the data provided by Taiwan Election and Democratization Survey 2016 (TEDS2016-T), 55.6 percent of interviewees identified themselves as Taiwanese, 3.6 percent as Chinese, and 36.9 percent as both Chinese and Taiwanese (double identification).¹⁹ Through a cross-tabling analysis, one can find out that among those interviewees identifying themselves as Taiwanese, more preferred the DPP (44.5 percent) than other parties, but for those identifying themselves as Chinese or as both, more preferred the KMT (50.7 percent or 36.8 percent).²⁰

The growth of Taiwanese identity and the latter's connection with party preference are suggested by the SJTU survey as well. While 67.4 percent of interviewees identified themselves as Taiwanese, only 4.2 percent considered themselves as Chinese, and 25.2 percent identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese. Although 51.8 percent of KMT supporters considered themselves as Chinese or as both Chinese and Taiwanese, 88.5 percent of DPP supporters identified themselves as Taiwanese only. However, when being asked the identity issue from cultural and ancestral (blood) perspectives, 53.8 percent of interviewees identified themselves as part of the Chinese nation, 3.2 percent as part of the Chinese, 25.2 percent accepted both options, only 11 percent rejected both options, and 6.9 percent refused to answer. Similarly, according to Taiwan Social Change Survey conducted by Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica one year earlier, 91.9 percent of interviewees agreed the Chinese nation includes 23 million Taiwanese in Taiwan.²¹ This means that the overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan are willing to be identified with the Chinese nation, which may

provide a *new* common base for convergent self-identification in the future.

TEDS2016-T survey has suggested that more people in Taiwan were inclined to independence rather than unification. When interviewees were asked to make a choice among six options — (1) instant independence, (2) maintaining the status quo and getting independence later, (3) maintaining the status quo forever, (4) maintaining the status quo and deciding later, (5) maintaining the status quo and getting unification later, and (6) instant unification — the percentages were 3.3, 18.3, 26.9, 32.7, 9.7, 1.2, respectively. If we combine the first two options as favoring Taiwanese independence and the last two options as favoring unification, the percentages would be 21.6 versus 10.9, with the majority of interviewees (59.6 percent) prefer maintaining the status quo to a different degree. Again, a cross-tabling analysis has demonstrated that among those who were inclined to independence, more preferred the DPP (53.8 percent) and few preferred the KMT (10.6 percent), but for those who were inclined to unification, more preferred the KMT (40.5 percent) than the DPP (16.7 percent). Regarding Taiwan's future, the SJTU survey has suggested that when the interviewees were asked whether or not they supported unification if the mainland had the same political system as Taiwan, 35.3 percent of them supported unification and 51.2 percent still rejected it. More KMT supporters (56.5 percent) supported conditional unification with the mainland and fewer (34.9 percent) opposed. By contrast, most DPP supporters opposed conditional unification (62.1 percent) and only 28.9 percent supported it. Even so, conditional unification is acceptable to different portions of supporters in either party. The developmental trend of this attitude deserves further observation.²²

The polarizing Service Trade Agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has also revealed the divergent party system underpinned by a divided Taiwanese society. According to the SJTU survey, 58.6 percent of interviewees supported the demands of the Sunflower Movement and only 27.8 percent disagreed. However, most KMT supporters (68.2 percent) disagreed with the students' position, while most DPP supporters (88.7 percent) endorsed it. While KMT supporters were more friendly than unfriendly toward people on the mainland (42.1 percent versus 36.6 percent), DPP supporters were more unfriendly than friendly on this issue (66.5 percent versus 14.2 percent). As for whether Taiwan should continuously negotiate with the mainland based on the

“1992 consensus,” 44.5 percent of interviewees agreed, 37.4 percent disagreed, and 18 percent had no opinion. In comparison, 77.3 percent of KMT supporters agreed, and 12.2 percent of them disagreed. However, only 34.7 percent of DPP supporters agreed, but 54.1 percent disagreed. This suggests that DPP supporters were more divided on this issue than that of the KMT.²³ According to TEDS2016-T, answers to the same questions are: 40.1 percent of interviewees agreed, 27.1 percent disagreed and 25.7 percent had no opinion. While 76.2 percent of KMT supporters agreed, and 6.9 percent of them disagreed, only 21.2 percent of DPP supporters agreed, but 49.7 percent disagreed. According to the survey mentioned above conducted by the Taiwan Thinktank, 34.3 percent of the respondents supported KMT chair Hung Hsiu-chu’s proposal to build political mutual trust of the two sides on the “1992 consensus” when she met CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, and 51.4 percent of the respondents did not support.²⁴ For those who supported Hung’s proposal, 70 percent of them are KMT supporters. The ideological confrontation between the two main parties, particularly in terms of national identity, has politicized public policymaking and implementation in Taiwan.

In addition, because of the political confrontation between the Blue and the Green camps, many people have a low evaluation of the democratic practice in Taiwan. According to the SJTU survey, only 30.3 percent of interviewees felt satisfaction toward democratic practice, and 61.2 percent felt dissatisfaction; 4.2 percent felt very satisfied, and 30.7 percent felt very unsatisfied. While 50.7 percent of KMT supporters felt satisfied, and 40.7 percent of them felt unsatisfied, 72 percent of DPP supporters felt unsatisfied, and only 21.8 percent felt satisfied. When being asked whether the two main parties should insist on their own policy position at the cost of social confrontation, 56.9 percent of KMT supporters disagreed and 32.8 percent agreed. Meanwhile, 47.9 percent of DPP supporters agreed and 41.7 percent disagreed. This suggests that a considerable number of KMT or DPP supporters are unsatisfied with democratic practice in Taiwan and do not like the confrontational nature of divergent party politics. Furthermore, according to the survey data, only half of Taiwanese people have party identification or preference.

To sum, while the overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan consider themselves as Taiwanese, they are more divided in whether they are part of the Chinese as well (55.6 percent vs. 36.9 percent). Meanwhile, they overwhelmingly identify themselves as part of the Chinese nation.

While social cleavage on the issue of independence versus unification has clearly informed different party preferences of the general public, making it difficult for the two main parties to reconcile with each other, moderates on this issue have served as a bridge between extreme views.

b. Institutional Design and Its Implications

The Social cleavage between the Blue and the Green has resulted in more confrontation and less compromise in party politics in Taiwan. Historically, power disparities between the KMT and the opposition DPP had induced the latter to combine rational boycott with emotional confrontation in the legislature before 2000. When the DPP unexpectedly won the 2000 election (because of the split of the KMT), it did not enjoy a majority of seats in the legislature. Nevertheless, Chen Shui-bian could appoint his executive team members without the approval of the majority of Blue legislators because of the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected chief executive and legislature. The Blue legislators, therefore, had strong sentiments and capacity to boycott the DPP administration. Political confrontation in the legislature during 2000–2008 vividly demonstrated such institutional handicaps in Taiwan's party politics. After 2008, the Green legislators followed suit. The KMT's overwhelming majority in the legislature since 2008, in addition to its control of the executive power, has failed to produce efficient governance as well.²⁵ In addition to DPP's confrontational strategies, there was an acute intraparty power struggle between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng, who does not fully endorse Ma's policy initiatives. In other words, the DPP's weak position within the legislature has been enhanced by a severe power struggle within the ruling KMT. Thus, the opposition DPP could still successfully block policy proposals of the Ma administration and resort to street demonstrations whenever it felt necessary. Vicious struggles between the main parties have marginalized the majority rule, leaving plenty of room for closed-door party caucus consultation featured by the rule of man. With frequent boycotts from the opposition parties, policies of the administration face obstacles in implementation.

If the problematic institutional design of power relations can be resolved through institutional reform toward a sort of parliamentary system, the radical confrontation between the executive branch and the majority of opposition legislators can be mitigated significantly. Taiwan's

current “president-parliamentary” system “initiated by the 1997 constitutional revision authorizes the elected president to nominate his premier as well as cabinet members without approval of the legislative branch.”²⁶ In exchange, the two executive heads (雙首長 *shuang shouzhang*) have only limited veto power against decisions (including resolutions, laws, budgets, and treaties) made by the legislature, which can validate a decision by a vote of the simple majority rather than the two-thirds majority. This institutional disadvantage may be minimized if the ruling party controls both executive and legislative powers. However, under the so-called “divided government” when different parties control each branch, the opposition party can easily boycott policy proposals of the administration by simple majority in the legislature. This poor institutional design cannot resolve political gridlock as “the president has no right to unilaterally dissolve the legislature, and the legislators do not want to take a risk of being dismissed for a snap reelection by casting a no confidence vote on the premier.”²⁷ Thus, the opposition legislators could only constrain the administration in policy area, contributing to inefficient governance.

From a long-term perspective, Taiwan’s electoral system may encourage a balanced two-party system. The electoral formula featuring single-member districts and plurality will readdress power relations between the two main parties through political realignment, competitive elections, and periodic power turnovers at different levels. Nevertheless, only if Taiwan changes its power arrangement from the “president-parliamentary system” into the French-styled “premier-president system” or simply adopts the presidential or parliamentary system can the institutional deadlock under divided government be fundamentally resolved.

c. Ideological and Policy Issues

The KMT and the DPP are divided not only on the issue of national identity but also on issues related to economic growth, social distribution, and environmental protection. The so-called “Blue Sky and Green Land” in Taiwanese political phraseology vividly demonstrates the contrast between the two parties. To begin with, the KMT was a party for unification by name (the Chinese Nationalist Party) and historically advocated such a goal. Although over the past two decades the party has gradually backed away from the vision and moved to the position of maintaining the status quo, it still opposes the idea of Taiwanese

independence. In contrast, the DPP accommodated the Taiwan Independence Clause in its party platform in 1991, the same year when the KMT government passed its National Unification Guidelines. Second, as a longtime ruling party, the KMT has an elitist orientation. Taking economic growth, gradual reform, and social stability as its priorities, the party gives high regards to big enterprises and cross-strait relations in promoting Taiwan's economic development while neglecting, to some degree, a balanced regional development, social distribution, and environmental protection. On the contrary, the DPP has a grassroots orientation. As a longtime opposition party with limited ruling experience, the party has more connections with lower classes. This inclination is reflected in the new administration's handling of the labor dispute of China Airlines, the holiday issue of laborers, as well as its decision to increase housing and inheritance taxes and reform the retirement benefit program. Its priorities are social justice, full employment, and comprehensive constitutional reform. If the KMT can be defined as a party of central-right, the DPP then can be called a party of central-left. This, of course, does not necessarily suggest that the DPP is always more liberal than the KMT. In fact, in handling economic ties with the mainland, the DPP is more conservative than the KMT, worrying the heavy economic interdependence with the mainland will result in the loss of Taiwan's political autonomy.²⁸

In recent years, the two parties have adjusted their economic and social policies in order to win over voters in the center. Both the "dynamic economy" proposed by the KMT and the "fine quality economy" proposed by the DPP during the 2012 election campaigns emphasize scientific innovation and infrastructural building to advance Taiwan's economic competitiveness and a balanced regional development. During the 2016 elections, Tsai Ing-wen proposed the New Model for Economic Development with core elements of innovation, job creation, and equitable distribution. Similarly, Eric Chu proposed a New Economy through raising wages of employees as the first step. Both realized the problems of a Taiwanese economy with its low growth rate, low wages, and overreliance on exports, and both saw the importance of developing domestic industries and market, including elderly and child care services, urban and public housing development, and food security. Both parties have talked about reducing energy consumption, developing new energies, ensuring social welfare and equality, and developing education and native

culture. The DPP, however, opposes nuclear energy without any reservation and highlights the multicultural roots in Taiwanese society to neutralize the Chinese influence on the island. This is highlighted in Tsai Ing-wen's 20 May inaugural address when she claimed that the new administration "will work to rebuild an indigenous historical perspective" and "restore indigenous languages and cultures."²⁹ While the Ma administration emphasizes the role of the mainland market on Taiwanese economic growth, Tsai is more concerned about "overreliance on a single market" and interested in upgrading domestic industries, promoting a "new southbound policy," and joining regional economic organizations, particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement led by the United States.³⁰ The fundamental difference between the two main parties remains whether Taiwan should be more attached to or detached from the mainland.

As the KMT has changed from a party striving for unification to a party maintaining the status quo, it is difficult to imagine that the party will go back to its original orbit. Recent debates within the party regarding whether "one China with respective expressions" should be attached to the "1992 consensus" have exposed the factional contradiction between the so-called "deep Blue" and "native Blue." While the "deep Blue" faction under the leadership of former chair Hung Hsiu-chu proposes to set aside different expressions of the meaning of one China and deepen the consensus with mainland, the "native Blue" led by the new chair Wu Den-yih insists on attaching the difference to the consensus. Their common point, however, is to accept the one-China framework in principle.

Meanwhile, a significant number of political elites within the DPP are preparing to adjust its mainland policy as part of Tsai's works in the "last mile of road" toward electoral victory. At the last session of Huashan meetings aimed at exploring the possible adjustment of the DPP's mainland policy in early 2014, Ker Chien-ming, convener of the DPP caucus in the legislature, even proposed to freeze the Taiwan Independence Clause. While the party has not adopted this proposal, one cannot exclude the possibility in the future. In a speech delivered at National Taiwan University on 12 August 2014, Tsai recognized that the DPP should adopt a brand new approach to deal with the mainland because the factors of mainland and cross-strait relations were most crucial to Taiwan's development in the future. More interestingly, in her speech, she used the term "Taiwan's political autonomy" to replace other concepts

more provocative to Beijing such as sovereignty and independence.³¹ During her American trips in the summer of 2015, Tsai claimed that the DPP would “push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations” in accordance with “the existing ROC constitutional order.”³² While she refused to accept the “1992 consensus,” she did not deny it either. Rather, she tried to replace if not accommodate the idea in ambiguous expressions — the cumulative products of cross-strait negotiation, exchange and interaction over the past 20 years or so. In a response to Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun’s August 2015 comments that the mainland would not interfere with Taiwanese elections, Tsai said she hoped the *Chinese mainland* could deeply understand that power turnover between different parties is a normal phenomenon in Taiwan as a democratic *society* and that Taiwanese people will also care about the stability and peaceful development of cross-strait relations.³³

In a postelection interview with the *Liberty Times*, Tsai said that she understands and respects the “historical fact” that the SEF and ARATS had reached joint acknowledgments and mutual understanding through communication and negotiations in 1992 based on the spirit of seeking common ground while setting aside differences.³⁴ In her 20 May inaugural address, Tsai continued to use these ambiguous wordings to beat around the bush rather than clearly accepting the core meanings of the “1992 consensus” or recognizing both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, as Beijing demands. More recently, in her 10 October address, she referred to the PRC government as the “Chinese mainland authorities” — just like Beijing has referred to political regime on the island as “Taiwan authorities” — and used more words to talk about mainland affairs than external relations. This suggests the importance of the mainland factor has forced Tsai to make political compromise, however modest it is.

Will the DPP further adjust its mainland policy in the years to come? This is a barometer to observe the different trends of party politics — convergence or divergence — in Taiwan. Many observers on the mainland believe that the DPP’s landslide victory in the elections will reduce the incentive for Tsai Ing-wen to significantly adjust the party’s mainland policy while other observers think it can just assure the party to move to the central line, getting more votes from moderate people than what it might lose from its fundamental supporters. Still others argue that from the perspective of governance rather than election, Tsai Ing-wen may have to prepare a solid base for dealing with the mainland before it is too late. It is worthwhile to observe that given the DPP’s great victory in the

2014 and 2016 elections, its main social foundations have quietly expanded from rural areas to urban areas, with more supporters from middle and high social strata. This may induce the party to pay more attention to economic and urban development, which are closely related to the factors of mainland and cross-strait relations, as Tsai Ing-wen recognized in her August 2014 speech. Furthermore, the DPP's provocative strategy toward the mainland during the Chen Shui-bian administration has resulted in Washington's suspicion of the party. Since the 2016 elections, DPP chair Tsai Ing-wen has been under greater U.S. pressure to make the party's mainland policy acceptable to both the mainland and the United States. This may help reduce the ideological gap between the two parties on how to deal with the mainland.

3. Conclusion

The outcome of the 2016 elections has categorically changed the political landscape in Taiwan. Institutionally, the game of the plurality voting system tends to marginalize the third party and encourage a balanced two-party system. It may also pull the two parties toward the central line amid increasing interparty competition. From the social perspective, however, the inherently different supporters of the two parties tend to pull the parties away from the direction of convergence. While KMT supporters are more caring about economic growth and a good relationship with the mainland, DPP supporters are more concerned about distributional justice and worried that close cross-strait relations may present a greater threat to the island, either politically or economically. These social cleavages have underscored different policy positions of the two parties. The fundamental difference remains whether Taiwan should be attached to or detached from the mainland in the future.

The deep roots of divergent party politics in Taiwan lie in the lack of a pluralist atmosphere based on crosscutting interests in society, the inability to have a frequently changing majority consisting of multiple minorities. While a plural society theoretically excludes the existence of a minority on all policy issues, encouraging people to accept the majority rule, Taiwanese party politics, informed by the cumulative social cleavages plus the winter-take-all electoral system, unavoidably create a circumstance when the satisfaction of one group of people after power turnover between the two parties is preconditioned on the deprivation of

the interests of another group of people. Consequently, mass media are deeply involved in party politics, with clear preferences toward one party against another, losing its spirit of neutrality, liberty, and justice. Once the zero-sum game of electoral competition is extended into the sphere of public policy, the outcome is party confrontation and social split. This creates a unique phenomenon in Taiwan's party politics: the new ruling party always wants to pretend it is a "government for all people," taking a central line, but quickly shifts back to its original position. However, as the DPP has expanded its ruling map from the southern to the central and northern parts of Taiwan and controlled both executive and legislative branches, one cannot help but wonder whether its social basis is changing. If this is the case, one may expect increasingly convergent features of Taiwan's party system, particularly in view of the growing importance of the central voters and the mainland factor to the island's development in the future.

Notes

- 1 Although the DPP has proposed to maintain the status quo in recent years, it is still unwilling to accept the "1992 consensus," which is interpreted by the KMT as "one China with different expressions." Both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agree there has been a consensus between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 1992, when the two semiofficial institutions—the Mainland-based Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF)—used the same terms such as "one-China principle" and "striving for national reunification" in their written communications. However, they disagree on whether the *meaning* of "one China"—which side represents China—can be expressed differently. Su Chi, former chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan, created the term "1992 consensus" in 2000 to encapsulate the KMT's original idea of "one China with different expressions" (各自表述 *gezi biao shu*) of its meaning. Beijing, on the other hand, interprets the "1992 consensus" as a tacit agreement on the principle of one China without touching upon its specific meaning (各不表述 *gebu biao shu*). The DPP has refused to accept the "1992 consensus" for many years but has not denied it either in the past two years. In addition, Tsai Ing-wen employed the language of "joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common aground" reached during "the 1992 talks" between the SEF and ARATS to beat around the bush without accepting the core meaning of the "1992 consensus."

- 2 Gabriel A. Almond, et al., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2006), p. 90; Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
- 3 Dafydd Fell, *Government and Politics in Taiwan* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 60.
- 4 Shelley Rigger, "Kuomintang Agonistes: Party Politics in the Wake of Taiwan's 2016 Elections," *Orbis*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2016), p. 489.
- 5 The KMT enjoys, however, a clear majority in these two positions in Hualien, Kinmen, and Matzu. It has more seats of neighborhood heads in Taipei and more township representatives in Hsinchu County than nonpartisans.
- 6 Maurice Duverger has made a conceptual distinction between psychological and mechanical effectiveness of single-member-district plurality system on the number of relevant parliamentary parties. See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London: Lowe & Brydone, 1964), pp. 224–226; Fell, *Government and Politics in Taiwan*, p. 55.
- 7 Available at <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/main.php>.
- 8 Database of Center for Taiwan Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
- 9 Hu Lingwei, "An Analysis of Developmental Trend in Taiwan's Political Ecology" [Taiwan zhengzhi shengtai fazhan qushi fenxi], paper presented in a seminar on Taiwan's Party Politics, hosted by Shanghai Public Relations Institution, 4 July 2016, Shanghai.
- 10 Ogasawara Yoshiyuki, "An Analysis of the 2016 Elections in Taiwan," *Taiwan Studies*, No. 3 (2016), pp. 1–20.
- 11 Richard Bush, "The 2016 Election and Prospects for Taiwan's Democracy," *Orbis*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2016), pp. 480–481.
- 12 Rigger, "Kuomintang Agonistes," pp. 502–503.
- 13 Jacques deLisle and June Teufel Dreyer, "Editor's Corner," *Orbis*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Fall 2016), p. 466.
- 14 Tsai gained 800,000 more votes in 2016 than what she gained in 2012. Most of them, however, came from the new voters. Meanwhile, James Soong gained 1.2 million more votes than he did in 2012.
- 15 For more details of this measurement, see Lin Gang, "Evolution of Party Politics in Taiwan Revisited," *Cross-Taiwan Strait Studies* (Shanghai Institute for Taiwan Studies), No. 2 (2016), pp. 55–57.
- 16 Before 2014, Taiwan held metropolitan mayoral elections following the election years for county and city executives. For example, country and city executive elections were held in 1997, followed by Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections in 1998. Valid votes of these two types of local executive elections are combined in the figure and divided by qualified voters in total.
- 17 Although the DPP won the 1997 local executive elections with more mayoralties and county magistracies, the votes it gained were only little more than

those of the KMT. When the votes for the CNP were taken into account, the Blue votes were a little more than the Green votes.

- 18 See <http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/chinese/page/5/61/3171/0>.
- 19 TEDS2016-T is a CATS survey conducted in Taiwan from 2 December 2015 to 14 January 2016, with 5,841 samples, see http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/intro2/super_pages.php?ID=intro11&Sn=117.
- 20 Of double identifiers, however, 22.7 percent had no party preference. By contrast, according to TEDS 2012 (face-to-face interview conducted in Taiwan between 16 January and 18 February 2012, with 1,826 samples, see http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/intro2/super_pages.php?ID=intro11&Sn=26), 63.8 percent of double identifiers preferred the KMT, much higher than 36.8 percent, a product of declining popularity of the KMT over the past four years.
- 21 The 2013 Taiwan Social Change Survey (round 6, year 4) was a face-to-face interview conducted in Taiwan from 1 January to 31 December 2013, with 1,952 samples; see <http://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/sc/en/home2.php>.
- 22 For more discussions of the above survey, see Yang Zhong, "Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 25 (May 2016), pp. 336–352.
- 23 Database of Center for Taiwan Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
- 24 See <http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/chinese/page/5/61/3171/0>.
- 25 Shelley Rigger, *Why Taiwan Matters* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), p. 89.
- 26 Wu Yu-shan, "Semi-presidentialism—Easy to Choose, Difficult to Operate: The Case of Taiwan," in *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A Comparative Studies*, edited by Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 201–218.
- 27 Fell, *Government and Politics in Taiwan*, pp. 52–53.
- 28 For example, see Tung Chen-yuan, *Taiwan's Strategy toward China: From Bandwagoning to Balancing* (Taipei: Independent & Unique, 2011).
- 29 "President Tsai Ing-wen's Inaugural Address," *Taipei Times*, 21 May 2016, p. 1., <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/21/2003646753>.
- 30 Chang Ching-wen, *Tsai Ing-wen: From Negotiating Table to Presidential House* (Taipei: City Business Weekly, 2015), pp. 180–182, 212; "President Tsai Ing-wen's Inaugural Address."
- 31 Tsai Ing-wen, "Taiwan's Future" (speech at National Taiwan University, 12 August 2014), <http://www.crntt.com/doc/1033/3/4/3/103334386.html?coluid=0&kindid=0&docid=103334386>.
- 32 The existing constitutional order includes both the 1947 constitution and seven amendments since 1991. As far as the constitution per se is concerned, the territory defined by Article 4 has never been redrawn. Although the 1991 constitutional amendment states that clauses in the

Constitution are applicable only to the “free areas of Republic of China,” that is, the island of Taiwan and the islands of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, it also suggests that the “free areas” are still part of the territory.

33 News Release, Department of Press and Information, the Democratic Progressive Party, 15 August 2015, www.dpp.org.tw (emphasis added).

34 *Liberty Times*, 21 January 2016.

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